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Narrative Psychology and the Study of Self/Identity 
 
Much of what is said in this article derives from my recent book, Introducing 
Narrative Psychology: Self, Trauma and the Construction of Meaning 
(Crossley, 2000a). In that book, I began with the age-old, perennial question. 
What is a self? Who am I? C.S. Lewis once commented: ‘There is one thing, 
and only one in the whole universe which we know more about than that we 
could learn from external observation. That one thing is ourselves. We have, so 
to speak, inside information, we are in the know’ (Lewis, 1952). But how true 
is this? Are we ‘in the know’ about ourselves? 
 It may seem obvious to turn towards psychology in order to throw light on 
these complex questions regarding self and identity. After all, most people are 
drawn towards the study of psychology because they are interested in the 
‘human condition’, what makes us human, our loves, passions, hates and 
desires. But most of us find ourselves only a few months into a psychology 
degree when we realise that we are dealing with very little of this. Instead, you 
are enmeshed in statistics, principles of learning, cognition, abstract theories 
and theoretical models, all of which bear very little resemblance to anything 
you were originally interested in studying. Somewhat ironically, a great deal of 
contemporary psychology, supposedly an area devoted to the study of human 
beings, has become a totally ‘lifeless’ discipline. So where do we look, in the 
discipline of psychology, if we want to examine these questions of self and 
identity? 
 In Introducing Narrative Psychology, I suggested four main areas of 
psychology which address these issues. These included: i) experimentally 
based social psychology; ii) humanistic psychology; iii) psychoanalytic/ 
psychodynamic psychology; and iv) social constructivist approaches. 
Highlighting the limitations associated with each of these four areas, I opened 
the way for a new narrative psychology approach which, although influenced 
by these approaches (especially humanistic and social constructivist), had the 
potential to avoid the pitfalls endemic within them. 
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The Central Role of Language and Stories 
 
Of particular importance to the formulation of a narrative psychology approach 
is recognition, derived from social constructivist approaches, of the central role 
played by language and stories in the process of self construction. As Crites 
(1986), wrote: ‘A self without a story contracts into the thinness of its personal 
pronoun.’ And Mair: 
 
Stories are the womb of personhood. Stories make and break us. Stories sustain us 
in times of trouble and encourage us towards ends we would not otherwise 
envision. The more we shrink and harden our ways of telling, the more starved 
and constipated we become (Mair, 1989: 2) 
 
‘Always in emergencies’, argued Broyard (1992: 21), ‘we invent narratives’: 
 
We describe what is happening as if to confine the catastrophe. When people 
heard that I was ill, they inundated me with stories of their own illnesses, as well 
as the cases of friends. Storytelling seems to be a natural reaction to illness. People 
bleed stories and I’ve become a bloodbank of them (Broyard, 1992: 21) 
 
 
Narrative as an ‘Organising Principle’ for Human Life 
 
But it is not just the fact that people tell stories in making sense of themselves 
and others. A narrative psychological approach goes far deeper than that. For, 
central to this approach, is the development of a phenomenological 
understanding of the unique ‘order of meaning’ constitutive of human 
consciousness (see Crossley, 2000a; Polkinghorne, 1988). One of the main 
features of this ‘order of meaning’ is the experience of time and temporality. 
An understanding of temporality associated with the human realm of meaning 
is entirely different to that encountered in the natural sciences. This is because 
the human realm of meaning it is not related to a ‘thing’ or a ‘substance’ but to 
an ‘activity’ (Polkinghorne, 1988: 4). Everything experienced by human beings 
is made meaningful, understood and interpreted in relation to the primary 
dimension of ‘activity’ which incorporates both ‘time’ and ‘sequence’. In order 
to define and interpret ‘what’ exactly has happened on any particular occasion, 
the sequence of events is of extreme importance. Hence, a valid portrayal of 
the experience of selfhood necessitates an understanding of the inextricable 
connection between temporality and identity. 
 It is in accordance with these basic principles of temporality and 
connection that numerous authors such as MacIntyre (1981), Carr (1986) and 
Sarbin (1986) have put forward the idea that human psychology has an 
essentially narrative structure. Sarbin, for instance, proposes what he calls the 
‘narratory principle’; this is the idea that human beings think, perceive, 
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imagine, interact and make moral choices according to narrative structures. 
Sarbin uses the word narrative as coterminous with ‘story’: 
 
A story is a symbolised account of actions of human beings that has a temporal 
dimension. The story has a beginning, middle, and an ending (or as Kermode 
(1967) suggests, the sense of an ending). The story is held together by 
recognisable patterns of events called plots. Central to the plot structure are human 
predicaments and attempted resolutions. (Sarbin, 1986: 3) 
 
Sarbin treats narrative as the ‘organising principle for human action’. By this, 
he means that the concept of narrative can be used to help account for the 
observation that human beings always seek to impose structure on the flow of 
experience. Such a narrative principle invokes a humanisitic image of the self 
as a teller of stories, of heroes and villains, plots, and images of actors 
performing and engaging in dialogue with other actors. 
 Charles Taylor’s (1989) work is particularly important to the development 
of an understanding of self as intrinsically connected to temporality, 
interactions with others, and ultimately, morality. It is Taylor’s main 
contention that concepts of self and morality are inextricably intertwined - we 
are selves only in that certain issues matter for us. What I am as a self, my 
identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for me. To 
ask what I am in abstraction from self-interpretation makes no sense (Taylor, 
1989: 34). Moreover, my self-interpretation can only be defined in relation to 
other people, an ‘interchange of speakers’. I cannot be a self on my own but 
only in relation to certain ‘interlocutors’ who are crucial to my language of 
self-understanding. In this sense, the self is constituted through ‘webs of 
interlocution’ in a ‘defining community’ (Taylor ibid, 39; see also Crossley, 
N., 1996). This connection between our sense of morality and sense of self, 
according to Taylor, means that one of our basic aspirations is the need to feel 
connected with what we see as ‘good’ or of crucial importance to us and our 
community. We have certain fundamental values which lead us to basic 
questions such as ‘what kind of life is worth living?’; ‘What constitutes a rich, 
meaningful life, as against an empty, meaningless one’? (Taylor ibid, 42). 
 A vision of ‘the good’ becomes available for people in any given culture 
by being given expression or articulation in some form or another. This 
articulation most often occurs through language and symbolic systems such as 
custom and ritual which reverberate with knowledge of connections and 
relationships across the generations. (Taylor ibid, 91). Such articulation brings 
us closer to the good as a moral source and gives it further power and potency. 
Stories have a tremendous force in this process insofar as they have the 
capacity to confer meaning and substance on peoples’ lives, to subtly influence 
their progression and orientation towards a particular ‘good’ (ibid, 97). 
 For example, cultures transmit to children knowledge of typical patterns of 
relationships, meanings and moralities in their myths, fairytales, histories and 
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stories (see Bettelheim, 1976; Howard, 1991; Polkinghorne, 1988). And we are 
inculcated from a very early age to seeing connections between events, people 
and the world in a certain way through the stories and narratives told within 
our families (Langellier and Peterson, 1993; McAdams, 1993). Moreover, this 
process does not stop during childhood. As adolescents and adults we are 
exposed on a daily basis to TV dramas, soap operas, movie blockbusters and 
talk-shows, all of which play out, in the same way as the fairytale does for the 
child, eternal moral conflicts (see McLeod, 1997; Priest, 1996). 
 One of the central premises of a narrative psychological approach then, is 
of the essential and fundamental link between experiences of self, temporality, 
relationships with others and morality. We have a sense of who we are through 
a sense of where we stand in relation to ‘the good’. Hence, connections 
between notions of ‘the good’, understandings of the self, the kinds of stories 
and narratives through which we make sense of our lives, and conceptions of 
society, evolve together in ‘loose packages’ (Taylor ibid, 105). 
 
 
Human Experience and Narrative Structure 
 
Carr (1986) argues that the reality of human experience can be characterised as 
one which has a narrative or story-telling character (ibid, p.18). What would it 
be, he asks, to experience life as a ‘mere’ or ‘pure’ sequence of isolated events, 
one thing after another? In order to illustrate his thesis Carr draws upon 
phenomenological approaches such as Husserl’s theory of time consciousness 
which depicts the way in which humans ordinarily experience time. He 
basically makes a distinction between three levels of human experience: 
passive experience, active experience and experience of self/life. At each of 
these levels, human experience can be characterised by a complex temporal 
structure akin to the configuration of the storied form (see also Bruner, 1990; 
1991). In the following exploration of human time consciousness, we will look 
at each of these experiential levels in turn. 
 According to Husserl, even as we encounter events at the most passive 
level (that is, when we are not consciously aware that we are encountering 
them), they are charged with the significance they derive from our anticipation 
of the future (‘protention’) and our memory of things past (‘retention’). His 
point is not that we have the capacity to project and remember but that we 
cannot even experience anything as happening, as present, except against the 
background of what it succeeds and what we anticipate will succeed it. Hence, 
when we experience time, we have no option but to experience it as an 
interrelated ‘configuration’ of past-present-future. Our experience 
automatically assumes temporally extended forms in which future, present and 
past mutually determine one another as parts of a whole. Husserl gives the 
example of a note in a melody. When we are listening to a melody we do not 
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encounter notes in that melody as isolated elements or components. Rather, the 
note is encountered and ‘understood’ as part of a sequence as a whole. It only 
takes on ‘meaning’ in relation to the note that has preceded it and in 
anticipation of that which will succeed it. Hence the ‘presence’ of the note can 
only be encountered in relation to a mutually determined retentional-
protentional structure. This kind of temporal experience is analogous to the 
Gestalt phenomena often discussed in relation to spatial perception. 
 Carr proceeds to argue that if this ‘configurational’ dimension is true of our 
most passive experiences, it is even more so true of our active lives in which 
we ‘explicitly consult past experience, envisage the future and view the present 
as a passage between the two’. Carr argues that the ‘means-end’ structure of 
action that we experience in everyday life is akin to the beginning-middle-end 
plot structure of narrative and thus, ‘the structure of action … is common to art 
and life’. This idea is also central to literary theorist Paul Ricouer’s notion that 
‘time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative 
mode’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 85). According to Ricoeur there are two sorts of time in 
every story told: on the one hand a discrete succession that is open and 
theoretically indefinite, for example, a series of incidents for which we can 
always pose the question, ‘and then? and then?’, much like a chronicle of 
events. The other sort of time is characterised by integration, culmination and 
closure owing to which the story receives a particular configuration. In this 
sense, composing a story involves drawing together a series of events in order 
that they make sense in relation to one another (Ricoeur, 1991: 121). We tend 
to experience activities, both short and long term, in relation to this latter 
mode, sometimes referred to by Ricoeur as the process of emplotment. The 
point is, our present activity only makes sense, and is framed in terms of, a vast 
array of interrelated memories from times past and anticipations of and for the 
future. Hence, the temporal configuration characteristic of narrative structure is 
akin not only to passive but also to active human experience. 
 If we can talk of narrative structure in connection with individual passive 
and active experiences, then the notion of a ‘life-story’ requires yet a further, 
more comprehensive grasp which brings separate ‘stories’ together, takes them 
all as ‘mine’ and establishes connections among them (Carr, 1986: 75). 
Although we have argued that there is a past-present-future temporal 
configuration (a narrative structure) at the level of passive and active 
experience, it is not difficult too see that at this more complex level (life as a 
whole), something special is required in the way of a reflexive (looking back) 
temporal grasp, to hold together the phases of these longer-term phenomena 
and preserve their coherence. This, of course, is the classic process of 
autobiography in which there is an attempt to envisage the coherence of a life 
through selection, organisation and presentation of its component parts. Some 
authors such as Kierkegaard (1987) have argued that it is through this process 
of autobiographical selection that we become ethical beings; in the telling of 
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our life stories, we become responsible for our lives. Literary theorist Paul 
Ricoeur makes such responsibility central to his concept of ‘narrative identity’, 
arguing that the self only comes into being in the process of telling a life story 
(Ricoeur, 1986: 132). 
 It is important to point out here that we may be in danger of suggesting that 
in order to help us understand ourselves and our lives we actually need literary 
creations such as works of fiction, biography and autobiography. Indeed, 
Ricoeur, has been accused of placing too much emphasis on the role of ‘story’ 
as the instance where meaning is created, at the expense of ‘human life’ 
(Widdershoven, 1993). However, if we bring forth the conception of the 
narrative structure of human experience and action developed by Carr, we can 
see that the meaning created in the autobiographical act of reflection and that 
found within everyday experience and action, actually exist on a continuum 
rather than being radically discontinuous. In Carr’s terms ‘lives are told in 
being lived and lived in being told’ (ibid, p.61). The actions and sufferings of 
life can be viewed as a process of telling ourselves stories, listening to those 
stories and acting them out or living through them. Hence: 
 
It is not the case that we first live and act and then afterward, seated around the 
fire as it were, tell about what we have done … The retrospective view of the 
narrator, with its capacity for seeing the whole in all its irony, is not an 
irreconcilable opposition to the agent’s view but is an extension and refinement of 
a viewpoint inherent in action itself … narration, intertwined as it is with action, 
(creates meaning) in the course of life itself, not merely after the fact, at the hands 
of authors, in the pages of books. (ibid, p.61) 
 
 When Carr refers to narration here, he is not just referring to the fact that a 
great deal of our everyday conversations are devoted to telling stories 
(although this is true). His point about narrative is more to do with its role in 
constituting the sense of the actions we engage in and the events we live 
through, its role in organising temporally and giving shape and coherence to 
the sequence of experiences we have as we are in the process of having them 
(ibid, p.62). Hence, the notion of narrative structure or the act of narrative 
structuring does not necessarily take on the form of explicit verbalisation. It 
refers more to the fact that, as the agent or subject of experience, I am 
constantly attempting to: 
 
surmount time in exactly the way the storyteller does’. I constantly ‘attempt to 
dominate the flow of events by gathering them together in the forward-backward 
grasp of the narrative act … (ibid, p.62) 
 
 Carr further argues that our constant attempt to achieve a sense of structure 
and order in the course of our everyday activities and lives is firmly based on 
our practical orientation within the world. In order to get on in everyday life 
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we need things to hang together, to make sense, to have some sense of 
connection. If, for instance, I found myself writing this paper and it bore very 
little resemblance to anything I had ever done before, I would have great 
difficulty pursuing it because I would be unable to see the point - why am I 
doing this? Where will it take me? Where do I go from here? And for the most 
part it is ‘normal’ for us to experience such narrative coherence in the sense 
that for most of us, for most of the time ‘things do, after all, make sense, hang 
together’ (ibid, p.90). 
 It is in this sense that Carr insists that everyday reality is permeated with 
narrative and that the human experience of time is one of configured time. ‘The 
narrative grasp of the story-teller’, he claims, ‘is not a leap beyond time but a 
way of being in time. It is no more alien to time than the curving banks are 
alien to the river or the potter’s hands to the clay’ (ibid, p.89). According to 
this perspective, literary stories such as fiction and autobiography do not in any 
sense ‘impose’ a structure and order on human action and life. Instead, they 
tend to reinforce and make more explicit the symbolisation that is already at 
work within a culture at the level of practical human action. The function of 
narratives such as autobiographies then, is simply to reveal structures or 
meanings that previously remained implicit or unrecognised, and thus to 
transform life and elevate it to another level. 
 
 
But is Human Life Narratively Configured? 
 
In characterising psychological life through the concept of narrative, however, 
are we not overplaying the significance played by the storied form in human 
experience? At the level of ‘personal’ experience, some researchers have 
argued that although human experience may bear some resemblance to the 
story, the idea that it takes on a narrative structure is mistaken. The core of this 
argument is that the coherent temporal unity lying at the heart of stories (the 
connection between beginning, middle and end) is something that is not at all 
intrinsic to real human events, real selves and real life. As literary theorist 
Frank Kermode argues, such ‘narrative properties cannot be ascribed to the 
real’ (cited in Wood, 1991: 160). The historian Louis Mink argues a similar 
point: ‘Stories are not lived but told … Life has no beginnings, middles and 
ends...Narrative qualities are transferred from art to life’ (cited in Wood, 1991: 
161). 
 A related point is made by literary theorist Roland Barthes with regard to 
the selective capacity of the author of the story and his/her ability to create and 
determine coherence and order within the text. The literary text has a sense of 
structure and order because the elements and events making up the story have 
been ‘put there’ by the author. Disruptive elements have been ‘eliminated’. 
Life, in contrast to the careful manipulation of the story, cannot possibly have 
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such a structure. Thus, it has been argued, whereas the story has an ‘implicit 
contract’ towards order, life has no such contract. (Bell, 1990: 174). In this 
sense, it is claimed, the story differs radically from ‘life’ insofar as in the latter, 
everything is ‘scrambled messages’, ‘chaos rather than order’ (see Carr cited in 
Wood, 1991: 161). 
 There is some truth to this argument. However, is it the case that life 
admits of no selection, that everything is ‘left in’, a vast array of ‘scrambled 
messages’? For example, Carr argues that our most basic capacity for attention 
and following through various activities or projects is premised on our capacity 
for selection. Hence, just like the author of the literary text, we partially 
determine the course of our own lives by selecting and omitting certain 
elements and events. As Carr argues: 
 
Extraneous details are not left out but they are pushed into the background, saved 
for later, ranked in importance. And whose narrative voice is accomplishing all 
this? None but our own, of course. In planning our days and our lives we are 
composing the stories or the dramas we will act out and which will determine the 
focus of our attention and our endeavours, which will provide the principles for 
distinguishing foreground from background. (Carr cited in Wood, 1991: 165) 
 
This may be story planning or plotting, but is it story-telling? ‘Most assuredly 
it is, quite literally, since we are constantly explaining ourselves to others. And 
finally each of us must count himself among his own audience since in 
explaining ourselves to others we are often trying to convince ourselves as 
well’ (Carr cited in Wood, 1991: 165). Hence, through the interrelated 
processes of story-plotting and story-telling we partially determine the stories 
of our lives. 
 The word ‘partial’ is important here, however, because we should not take 
this point - the self as a teller of her own story - too far. The critical arguments 
of theorists who dispute the analogy between ‘life’ and ‘narrative’ are 
important insofar as they emphasise the fact that, unlike the author of fiction, 
we do not totally create the materials we are to form. To a certain degree, we 
are stuck with what we have in the way of characters, capacities and 
circumstances. For instance, if a woman is married to a man who batters her 
every night when he comes in drunk from the pub, the fact that she secretly 
harbours fantasies of a white knight in shining armour coming to rescue her 
one day and that everything will turn out OK in the end, will have very little 
influence on her real life which is likely to be characterised by repeated abuse, 
dependency and further victimisation. 
 Likewise, just as we are unable to control the beginnings of our stories, so 
too are we unable, unlike the fictional author, to describe our already 
completed lives. Instead, we are in the middle of our lives and we cannot be 
sure how they will end. Hence, although I may have a plan to write my next 
book, I do not have any idea what may await me around the corner. As the old 
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proverb goes, ‘There’s many a slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip’ (Crites, 1986: 
166). All manner of things could happen to forestall my plan and render it 
irrelevant. For example, I may be made redundant, in which case I would 
probably feel there is little point in continuing to write a book. I may fall 
seriously ill and be rendered incapable of completing the project; or even if I 
remained capable, my goals and values may change in the face of confrontation 
with the possibility of death. I may have to rethink my aims and projects, 
change direction, and start a new story. Hence, the fact that we cannot wholly 
determine either the beginning or the end of our lives, suggests that our 
activities and projects do lack the formal order and coherence of literary 
stories. Life, unlike the story, does not have an ‘implicit contract’ towards 
order. 
 However, one of the main aims of a narrative psychological approach is to 
provide an alternative to certain social constructionist and postmodernist 
approaches which have considerably overplayed the disorderly, chaotic and 
variable nature of contemporary human experience (Crossley, 2000c). On a 
routine, daily basis, there is more order and coherence than such accounts 
suggest. This is nowhere more apparent than when we examine traumatising 
experiences, which have the capacity to painfully highlight the ‘normal’ state 
of narrative coherence which is routinely taken-for-granted and thus remains 
‘unseen’ within the active experiencing of everyday existence. 
 
 
Narrative Incoherence and the Breach of Trauma 
 
One good example of disruptive traumatising experiences is that of chronic or 
serious illness. In recent years numerous studies of chronic illness have 
illustrated the potentially devastating impact they can have on a person’s life. 
This has been characterised as an ‘ontological assault’ in which some of the 
most basic, underlying existential assumptions that people hold about 
themselves and the world are thrown into disarray (Crossley, 2000b; Janoff 
Bulman, 1992; Kleinman, 1988; Taylor, S., 1989). 
 One of the most fundamental building blocks of the perceived world to be 
destroyed in the experience of chronic illness, is one’s basic sense of time. 
Many phenomenologically and existentially oriented writers have highlighted 
that time is basic and fundamental to an understanding of contemporary human 
existence insofar as our normal, routine temporal orientation is one of 
projecting into the future. It is important to make clear, however, that we are 
not necessarily consciously aware of the fact that we project into the future in 
this way. Our taken-for-granted assumptions about and towards time, are only 
made visible when a ‘shock’ or a ‘disruption’ occurs, throwing them into sharp 
relief (see Schutz, 1962; Garfinkel, 1984). The experience of chronic illness 
constitutes such a disruption. When a person receives a serious illness 
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diagnosis, they are immediately shocked out of the complacency of the 
assumed futurity of their existence and their whole conception of themselves, 
their life and their world is likely to undergo radical changes. Frank (1995) 
uses the metaphor of ‘narrative wreckage’ to characterise such experiences. 
 In previous research, I have shown how much of the traumatic emotional 
and psychological impact of living with a HIV positive diagnosis can be traced 
back to the disturbance and disruption of this fundamentally experienced sense 
of ‘lived time’ (Davies, 1997). The threat of chaos, of meaninglessness, is 
evident in the following quote from Paula, a HIV positive woman I 
interviewed, whose husband, a haemophiliac had recently died from HIV 
infection. When I asked her about her plans for the future she said: 
 
I don’t think of the future as in what is going to happen in a year’s time or 
whatever. My future seems to have stopped when Mark (her husband) died 
because I am on my own and I just live from day to day … I am only 28 and I feel 
as if I have been put in a shop and left there … It is as if I am stuck in a sort of 
bubble and nothing seems to, I can’t get out of it … it’s frightening to think that I 
am going to be like that until I die … It’s terrible when you have got no-one to 
talk to … that’s a large part of it now for me, it is the loneliness, especially of a 
night-time when the kids are in bed … I often keep the baby up just to keep me 
company, it is horrible, I shouldn’t because he needs his rest … but … if I do send 
him to bed, it is so silent, it is just me. Often I go to bed early because I can’t stand 
being on my own … 
 
Paula’s comments make abundantly clear the ‘unmaking’ of her world, and 
highlight her previous taken-for-granted sense of identity and projection into 
the future. 
 
 
Adapting to Trauma: Stories and Narrative Coherence 
 
Research into the experience of chronic and serious illness illustrates the way 
in which our routine, ‘lived’ sense of time and identity is one of implicit 
connection and coherence. This sense is severely disrupted in the face of 
trauma and it is in such contexts that stories become important as a way of re-
building a sense of connection and coherence. As the recent proliferation of 
autobiographies (especially in relation to diseases such as cancer and 
HIV/AIDS) and self-help groups suggests, for people suffering the trauma of 
illness, storytelling takes on a ‘renewed urgency’ (Mathieson and Stam, 1995: 
284). Of course, such a narrative understanding bears a strong affinity with 
Freud's work, which equated mental ill health with an ‘incoherent story’ and 
narrative breakdown. From this perspective, psychotherapy constituted an 
exercise in ‘story repair’ and, as Spence (1982) argued: 
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Freud made us aware of the persuasive power of a coherent narrative - in 
particular of the ways in which an aptly chosen reconstruction can fill the gap 
between two apparently unrelated events, and in the process, make sense out of 
nonsense. There seems no doubt but that a well constructed story possesses a kind 
of narrative truth that is real and immediate and carries an important significance 
for the process of therapeutic change. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has aimed to introduce some of the main themes underpinning a 
narrative approach towards psychology. Drawing on some of dominant 
theories in this area, it has argued that human life carries within it a narrative 
structure to the extent that the the individual, at the level of tacit, 
phenomenological experience, is constantly projecting backwards and forwards 
in a manner that maintains a sense of coherence, unity, meaningfulness and 
identity. From this perspective, the characterisation of human experience as 
one of constant flux, variability and incoherence, as manifest in many 
discursive and postmodern approaches, fails to take sufficient account of the 
essential unity and integrity of everyday lived experience. In accordance with 
this theoretical perspective, it has been argued that the experience of traumatic 
events such as serious illness are instrumental in facilitating an appreciation of 
the way in which human life is routinely narratively configured. This is 
because the experience of traumatisation often serves to fundamentally disrupt 
the routine and orderly sense of existence, throwing into radical doubt our 
taken-for-granted assumptions about time, identity, meaning, and life itself. 
When this happens, it is possible to examine the way in which narratives 
become important in another sense. This is in terms of the way in which they 
are used to restore a sense of order and connection, and thus to re-establish a 
semblance of meaning in the life of the individual. Accordingly, narratives of 
illness are useful because they help to reveal structures or meanings that 
typically remain implicit or unrecognised, thus potentiating a transformation of 
life and elevation to another level. 
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